

1918—



—1947

Entered as 2nd class matter

MR. PAUL F. MANLEY  
17917 SCHNELEY AVE.  
CLEVELAND 19, OHIO

CLM-1

# FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN

*An interpretation of current international events by the Research Staff of the Foreign Policy Association*

FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION, Incorporated

22 East 38th Street, New York 16, N. Y.

VOL. XXVII, No. 7

NOVEMBER 28, 1947

## HOW SHOULD U.S. ANSWER SOVIET PROPAGANDA ABROAD?

IN his Chicago speech of November 18, on the eve of his departure for the sixth session of the Council of Foreign Ministers which opened in London on November 25, Secretary of State Marshall raised an important question concerning American-Russian relations. This question is whether the United States should attempt to answer the "calculated campaign of vilification and distortion of American motives in foreign affairs" waged "with increasing venom" by Soviet officials and Communist groups elsewhere; and if so, in what form American answers should be couched. Should American spokesmen seek to match the vituperation of Mr. Vishinsky—or should they disregard words of abuse, and limit themselves to pointing out the positive aspects of our way of life? Is it wise or not for this country to embark on a national "Operation Back-talk" like that launched against the Russians on October 28 by General Clay in the American zone of Germany—a program which, according to firsthand reports, shows signs of petering out?

WHAT IS GOOD U.S. PROPAGANDA? These questions reveal the need for determining the scope and content of American propaganda abroad. Many of the Congressmen who visited Europe during the past few months have returned convinced that this country must be more generous in its appropriations for the Office of Information in the State Department, now operating on the shoestring budget of \$12,800,000 a year. But even should Congress heed the proposal of Representative Karl Mundt, Republican, of South Dakota, that this sum be raised to \$300,000,000 for six years (or \$50,000,000 a year), administrators of the information program will still face many questions as to what constitutes an effective reply to the propaganda conducted by the Soviet government and by Communist parties outside

Russia. In seeking answers to these questions, the following points might be considered:

1. *Need to Convince Non-Russians.* The object of American information services is not so much to convince the Soviet leaders, or even the Russian people (although any such by-product of American propaganda would obviously be welcome), but to convince peoples outside Russia who for one reason or another find some appeal in Soviet arguments. Little is gained, in this respect, by mere denunciation of Soviet ideas and practices—especially since it is doubtful that American spokesmen can match the virulence of Mr. Vishinsky. What can be done is to demonstrate by our actions that the United States, within the limits of its capacity, is determined to help other peoples improve their lot.

2. *"One World"—But Many Peoples.* In addressing itself to peoples outside its borders, the United States should bear in mind that, while technological progress in transportation and communications has truly led to the

### This Generation's Chance for Peace

The first complete presentation of the issues involved in the Marshall Plan. Told in simple forceful language, the story covers in detail the progress of events since the Marshall speech of last June, and points up vividly the alternatives now confronting the countries of Europe and the American people.

*Written by the staff of the Foreign Policy Association  
and by editors of the Washington Post—published by  
the Washington Post.*

The FPA is sending a copy of this important publication to each of its members as a public service.

*Additional copies may be ordered at 5¢ each; 25 copies for \$1.*

FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION  
22 East 38th Street, New York 16, N. Y.

Enclosed is \$..... to cover ..... copies of  
THIS GENERATION'S CHANCE FOR PEACE.

Name.....

Street.....

City..... Zone..... State.....

*Contents of this BULLETIN may be reprinted with credit to the Foreign Policy Association.*

emergence of "one world," vast differences persist in the traditions, historical backgrounds, and political, social and economic development of the various peoples inhabiting this "one world." American information services should be sufficiently flexible and differentiated to meet the special needs and interests of the particular nations to which they are addressed—and should not be limited to a few blanket formulas about the advantages of the free enterprise system. To countries which, to begin with, do not possess the resources of the United States, and have been shattered by two world wars and a great depression, constant American emphasis on this concept sounds unrealistic, or patronizing, or both.

3. *U.S. Must not be Identified with Reaction.* The success of Soviet propaganda is due primarily to the existence throughout the world of genuine political, social and economic maladjustments which Communist propagandists skillfully exploit to denigrate democracy. It is therefore essential that American information services stress the need to correct these maladjustments by whatever methods seem most appropriate in a given country, provided political liberty, basic attribute of democracy, is preserved. An attitude of deprecation toward other systems simply because they are not like ours gives ammunition to Communist propagandists who claim that the United States intends to use its resources to stifle internal reforms in nations receiving American aid. It is of paramount importance that other peoples should have no cause to identify Washington's resistance to Russia and communism with support of reaction and resistance to all change abroad.

4. *Facts are our Greatest Strength.* All peoples, especially in Europe, have grown unutterably weary of propaganda and counter-propaganda. Our greatest strength lies in presenting factual information, as both the BBC and the OWI did during the war, when they won the confidence of listeners who defied Nazi terrorism to hear British and American broadcasts. In presenting information, it is wise to mention not only facts favorable to the United States, but also facts that are not so favorable. Other peoples have learned by hard experience that life is a mixture of good and evil, and that one cannot always expect a happy ending. When our propaganda attempts to give the impression that we are mercifully free of all the flaws we find in others, our admonitions are regarded as either naive or hypocritical. It would be much more effective to admit such faults and shortcomings as we may have, while pointing out our unremitting efforts to remedy them—as the President's Committee on Civil Rights has successfully done in its report. Wide circulation abroad of the findings and recommendations of this committee, which epitomizes some of the qualities the rest of the world particularly admires about Americans, would do far more to enhance the prestige of

the United States than any amount of "back-talk" at Russia.

Nor should the United States pretend that it alone among nations is above power politics. In one form or another power is always used in politics, whether national or international. Power is not of itself evil; what can be evil is the use one makes of power. What the world criticizes most about the United States is not that it uses its power too much, but that it has not yet developed a constructive foreign policy commensurate with the power at its command.

5. *Faith—Not Fear—Must Be Motive.* American propaganda should be motivated not by fear of Russia, which is purely negative, but by positive faith in American ideas, and by concrete measures to carry them out in practice abroad such as the program of farsighted aid urged by Secretary of State Marshall. Every time we reveal fear of Russia we thereby weaken our own position in the eyes of the rest of the world. Nor should we, through fear, force on other peoples a choice between Russia and the United States, which for many of them would be suicidal.

6. *Europe Must Have Means for Its Own Propaganda.* The most effective propaganda, as the Russians have discovered, is directed not from outside, but from inside. For example, commendation of our aid to Europe sounds more gracious if offered by writers and radio commentators in countries receiving aid than if presented by ourselves. Europe, however, is greatly handicapped by the shortage of newsprint, which has reduced most European newspapers to four, and often only two, pages. One of the most useful contributions the United States could make to the dissemination of information would be to make newsprint available to the countries of Western Europe. Here, too, we might learn from the Russians, who have helped their neighbors in Eastern Europe and the Balkans to obtain newsprint. More good words would be heard about the United States if Europeans who support the Marshall plan had a better opportunity to express their views directly to their own countrymen.

But, no matter how technically efficacious our propaganda may prove to be, we must always remember that words, written or spoken, have become devalued through overuse and overemphasis. Only actions can serve to revalue them. No matter how much money we spend on propaganda, the money will be wasted unless our actions abroad match our words. This means that we must do some hard thinking here about the basic concepts of our foreign policy, and develop greater understanding both of the world outside our borders and of our new role in world affairs.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

## TARIFF CUTS SET STAGE FOR HAVANA TRADE PARLEY

Overshadowed by the London meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers and the special session of Congress, the UN Conference on Trade and Employment, which opened in Havana on November 21, is not likely to attract the attention it merits. In terms of the foreign economic policy of the United States, however, this trade parley is a major event; it is, in fact, the culmination of many months of labor by the State Department to create, under the auspices of the UN, an International Trade Organization (ITO) with a charter binding member gov-

ernments to promote freer, nondiscriminatory world trade. Such a trading regime, it is contended, is indispensable if in the long-run the volume of world trade and employment is to remain at a high level.

The draft charter before the delegates of the sixty-three nations taking part in the Havana conference is one that was worked out by a preparatory committee which included the key trading powers. Moreover, the latter group of countries has also negotiated a multilateral trade agreement, which was signed in Geneva on October 29. This pact contains

a schedule of substantial tariff reductions, and includes in the preamble all the important commercial policy provisions of the proposed charter.

**MAIN ISSUES AT HAVANA.** The most controversial problem which the preparatory committee has had to consider is the demand of the underdeveloped countries that they be allowed to impose quantitative import restrictions in promoting industrial growth. At the London meeting, and later at Geneva, spokesmen for this group—notably the delegates of India, China, Chile and the Lebanon—contended that certain provisions of the draft charter, particularly those banning the use of import quotas, were designed to maintain the dominance of the more highly developed countries. The position taken by the American delegation, however, has been that measures to foster domestic industry should be limited to the time-honored devices of protective tariff duties and subsidies; quantitative controls, which tend to be discriminatory, should not be employed by any country irrespective of the stage of its development. But to permit agreement on this point, the United States proposed that an underdeveloped country might obtain permission through the ITO to employ restrictive measures, otherwise prohibited by the charter, in promoting new industries. Such approval should precede any change in import controls.

It is by no means certain that complete agreement on this problem will be reached during the Havana parley. On the contrary, the distinct possibility remains that several participants whose policy has been that of promoting economic development through state controls will reject the charter rather than consent to the principle of "prior approval." India and China, however, appear likely to accept the compromise worked out at Geneva. The Argentine delegation, on the other hand, may well lead a revolt of Latin American countries against such a solution.

Indirectly related to the problem of protective devices to be employed by underdeveloped countries are the issues of voting power and trade relations of members with nonmembers. If substantial agreement on the charter is possible only by making further concessions in favor of protectionism, the American delegation will insist on a voting system which will enable this country to exercise considerable control over the granting of exemptions by the ITO. Moreover, if a break with the less developed countries is unavoidable, a provision denying nonmembers the benefit of any tariff concessions made under the provisions of the charter will be sought. For the na-

tions of Western Europe, such a development would be highly embarrassing, since it would mean in effect the exclusion of Czechoslovakia and other eastern countries from the ITO, which would create another obstacle to a full revival of intra-European trade.

**TARIFF CUTS AT GENEVA.** The ITO project has all along been considered by Washington as a major step in the recovery of Europe, although the report of the Paris conference members has correctly pointed out that a large expansion of productive power is necessary before a sufficient export capacity can be achieved. But once goods are available for export, Western Europe will require access to the enormous American market if a viable economy is to develop. For this reason the tariff concessions made by our delegation in Geneva, which were published on November 17, are directly related to the European Recovery Program. In agreements signed with fifteen customs areas, this country reduced the duties levied on products which in 1939 accounted for 78 per cent of our total imports. Concessions on livestock, whiskey, wool, butter, shoes, woolens and worsteds, handkerchiefs, and so on, were granted. In return, we received important reductions in the duties levied on our exports, including substantial cuts in British Empire preferences.

The fact that the lowering of the American tariff has evoked criticism by the industry groups affected was not unexpected. The concessions we have made must be judged, however, in terms of the over-all productive capacity of the United States, which is not duplicated in any other country or region. On this basis, there is little warrant for the contention that our economy has received a crippling blow. Given the devastation and dislocation experienced by Western European countries during the war, it is hardly likely that their exporters will be able to flood the American market. With respect to the recovery of Europe, however, there is no gainsaying the fact that the beneficiaries of the aid program now under consideration by Congress must in time increase their supply of dollar exchange through exports. Failing this, there will be a permanent trend toward economic nationalism which will most certainly endanger the future of western civilization.

HAROLD H. HUTCHESON

*The Control of Alien Property*, by Martin Donke. New York, Central Book, 1947. \$7.50


A valuable supplement to *Trading With the Enemy in World War II* published in 1943, this volume is cumulative to 1947. It includes such items as the economic clauses of the Peace Treaties with former Axis satellites.

FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN. Vol. XXVII, No. 7, NOVEMBER 28, 1947. Published weekly by the Foreign Policy Association, Incorporated. National Headquarters, 22 East 38th Street, New York 16, N. Y. BROOKS EMERY, *President*; HELEN M. DAGGETT, *Secretary*; VERA MICHELES DEAN, *Editor*. Entered as second-class matter December 2, 1921, at the Post Office at New York, N. Y., under the Act of March 3, 1879. Four Dollars a Year. Please allow at least one month for change of address on membership publications.

F. P. A. Membership (which includes the Bulletin), Six Dollars a Year  
Produced under union conditions and composed and printed by union labor.



# Washington News Letter



## WILL LONDON CONFERENCE ACHIEVE UNIFICATION OF GERMANY?

The sixth session of the Council of Foreign Ministers gives the participating governments an opportunity to mend the East-West split in Europe. For today final division of Germany would mean division of the continent and of the world. The success of the Council will be measured by the extent to which it moves toward unification of the Reich.

**DIVIDED GERMANY, DIVIDED EUROPE.** Yet Russia and the United States have gone so far in the development of policies stressing the economic revival of limited portions of Europe that it is questionable whether either will be prepared to make concessions that could lead to the reuniting of Germany and thus of the continent. Despite an occasional sentence heartening to the optimist, nothing so far said by officials of the United States or the U.S.S.R. indicates that either has modified the irreconcilable positions taken last spring in Moscow, where the Council deliberated unsuccessfully from March 10 to April 24. As a result of the preparation of the European Recovery Program, however, the United States now regards the possibility of a prolonged division of Europe with more equanimity than it showed at Moscow.

Since the ERP aims first at the recovery of Western and Mediterranean Europe, the United States is ready to organize western Germany for a major role in the unfolding of the recovery program, whether or not Russia makes the production of its occupation zone in eastern Germany available to Western Europe. At Moscow the United States feared that the Soviet Union could delay general recovery by its German policy. Now the recovery program has allayed that fear, and Germany plays a positive role in American plans in contrast to its position at the time of the Moscow conference, when Secretary of State Marshall considered the defeated nation primarily as an economic drain on the American taxpayer. Marshall apparently is confident that, under the altered circumstances, he would serve American interests more surely by the economic improvement of western Germany under Anglo-American guidance than by making concessions to Russia about the whole of Germany. Moreover, division now need not prevent continental unity later on. American diplomacy rests on the hypothesis that the trend toward dictatorship will eventually destroy the Eastern European governments from within. Their successors, it is believed, will then take the initiative in seeking the restoration of East-West harmony in Europe.

In view of those considerations, the American delegation took off for London psychologically armed to withstand the shock of failure. Both the United States and Russia, however, face uncertainties if they stand intransigently by their Moscow platforms. The American hypothesis may prove to be false. Would the continued division of Germany after London result in the termination of all trade between Eastern and Western Europe, just as practically all trade has ceased between eastern and western Germany? Would the revival of Western Europe with little or no assistance from Eastern Europe strain the United States beyond its ability or willingness to send further aid to the West? The report of the Committee of European Economic Cooperation hints at the importance of Eastern Europe to the economy of the United States: "In the immediate future, the lack of supplies from normal sources in Eastern Europe and South-East Asia increases the urgency of the need for supplies from the American continent."

**A SEPARATE PEACE?** The key to German unity lies today in the very issues with which the Moscow conference grappled in vain. The United States and the U.S.S.R. disagreed last spring about the structure of the German government—the former favoring a federal, the latter a centralized system; about reparations—the former favoring their payment in capital equipment, the latter in current German industrial production; about Poland's western boundary; and about the 40-year German disarmament treaty proposed by the United States. The outlook for agreement on those issues is darkened by the fact that Germany has become a focal point for the mistrust between the United States and Russia.

If the London talks get nowhere, then the United States must decide whether it will write a separate peace with western Germany, as former Secretary of State Byrnes and others have suggested. Such a treaty, by formalizing the division of Germany, might lead to a permanent and complete European division; and it would leave Austria hopelessly truncated. Secretary Marshall is said to have in mind the alternative of merely strengthening the bond now linking the British and American occupation zones, and continuing his efforts to persuade France to join its portion of Germany to the bizon. Thus he would leave the question of separate peace for the future, with an implied invitation to Russia to renew negotiations later.

BLAIR BOLLES